On the Use of Singular Value Decomposition for a Fast Intrusion Detection System  by Rawat, Sanjay et al.
On the Use of Singular Value Decomposition
for a Fast Intrusion Detection System
Sanjay Rawat1 ,3
Dept. of Computer & Information Sciences
University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India
&
IDRBT
Castle Hills, Masab Tank, Hyderabad, India
Arun K. Pujari2 ,4
Dept. of Computer & Information Sciences
University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India
V. P. Gulati5
IDRBT
Castle Hills, Masab Tank, Hyderabad, India
Abstract
Traditionally, the application of data mining in intrusion detection systems (IDS) concentrates
on the construction of operational IDSs. The main emphasis is on data mining steps, and other
KDD (Knowledge Discovery in Databases) are largely ignored. The present study investigates the
applicability of Spectral Analysis technique - singular value decomposition (SVD) as a preprocessing
step to reduce the dimensionality of the data. This reduction highlights the most prominent features
in the data by removing the noise. This preprocessing step not only makes the data noise-free, but
also reduces the dimensionality of the data, thereby minimizing computational time. The proposed
technique can be applied to other existing methods to improve their performance. We perform
experiments on various data sets like DARPA’98, UNM sendmail, inetd, and login-ps data sets to
show that reduction in the dimension of the data does not degrade the performance of the IDS. In
fact, in case of single application monitoring like sendmail, by applying reduction techniques we
get very encouraging results.
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1 Introduction
With the widespread use of networked computers for critical systems, com-
puter security is attracting increasing attention and intrusions have become a
signiﬁcant threat in recent years. Intrusion detection is the process of mon-
itoring the events in a computer or network and analyzing them for signs of
intrusions. The number of intrusions is dramatically increasing and so are
the costs associated with them. The increasing frequency and complexity of
Internet attacks has raised the level of knowledge required by systems admin-
istrators to eﬀectively detect the intrusions. Therefore, intrusion detection
systems (IDS), which are software or hardware products that automate this
monitoring and analysis process [2], have become a critical component of Se-
curity Architecture. ID systems collect information from network activities
and system activities. Network-based systems look for speciﬁc patterns in the
network traﬃc and host-based systems look for those patterns in the audit ﬁles
generated by the system or some other device. On the basis of this collected
information, ID system takes decision about the activity as either normal or
intrusive. We can group ID systems into two classes: misuse based systems
and anomaly detection systems. Misuse detection refers to intrusions that
follow well-deﬁned patterns of attacks that exploit weaknesses in the system.
Misuse detection techniques have high detection rate for already known at-
tacks but show poor performance in the presence of a new attack or even
a variant of previously known attack. Anomaly detection systems attempt
to model (learn) usual or normal behavior, deﬁned by the security policy of
the organization. Any signiﬁcant deviation from this established behavior is
ﬂagged as potential intrusion. This class of ID systems has the capability
to detect new attacks and variants of previously known attacks, but the rate
of false positives is very high due to the lack of knowledge of the nature of
attacks. Anomaly based systems also face a problem of getting clean normal
data for its learning. Often in live network, it is very diﬃcult to claim to have
clean normal data. Normally the data contain some background activities,
termed as noise, which some times degrades the overall performance of the ID
system. Also, as mentioned earlier, a good amount of knowledge is required to
detect the presence of the attack. In other words, we should collect as much
information as possible so that attack can be manifested in this, but larger
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the amount of data to process, higher will be the cost in terms of time and
space, associated with it. This leads to a delay in identifying the presence
of attack and thus defeats the main purpose of having IDS i.e. on time de-
tection of the attack. Present breed of networks works on the speed of mbps
and gbps, thereby producing a huge amount of data in seconds. This imposes
a challenge for modern ID systems to process data at this speed. Also, our
experience with DARPA data shows that it is very diﬃcult to extract normal
and signiﬁcant process-level information without getting some other unneces-
sary information as, temporally, data is located very dense. Thus we may get
some information, which is not useful in distinguishing normal processes from
abnormal ones. In the view of above discussion, practically it is desirable to
process as less data as possible which adequately captures all the information
required for the manifestation of attacks. Also it has been observed [10] that
Data Mining based research in IDS concentrates on the construction of oper-
ational IDSs, rather than on the discovery of new and fundamental insights
into the nature of data, attacks and false positives. The main emphasis is on
data mining steps, and other KDD (Knowledge Discovery in Databases) are
largely ignored. In the present work, we focus on preprocessing of the data
to be analyzed for intrusion detection and investigate a method of reducing
the dimensionality of the data being fed into the host-based system without
degrading the performance of the system, by showing rigorous experimental
analysis. This work borrows ideas from one of the methods of information
retrieval - Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI) [4,3]. We make use of Spectral
Analysis to reduce the size of the vectors (explained later) derived from the
sequence of system calls by using singular value decomposition (SVD) [8]. We
show the eﬀectiveness of our approach by testing it with diﬀerent data sets
- DARPA’98 and UNM sendmail data - inetd data, ps data and login data.
We also compare our experimental results on DARPA’98 data with one of the
recent proposals by Liao and Vemuri [13].
The major contributions of this study are:
• It is established that dimensionality of the data can be reduced without de-
grading the performance of intrusion detection system, by using a technique
called SVD.
• To show the eﬀectiveness of the approach, we provide results of rigorous
experiments, performed on various data sets - DARPA’98 BSM logs and
UNM sendmail, login, ps data sets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy introduces
some of the related work in this area. In section 3, we cover some of the topics
as background work like LSI and SVD. The proposed scheme is explained in
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detail in section 4. All of the experimental analysis and results are provided
in the section 5, which is followed by the section 6, which concludes the work
with a note on future work.
2 Related Work
Anomaly-based IDS has the capability to identify new attacks, as any attack
will diﬀer from the normal activity. However, such systems have a very high
rate of false positives [2]. Hence, a lot of research is being done in the area
of anomaly-based intrusion detection [1]. A pioneering work in the ﬁeld of
anomaly detection by Denning [5] describes a model for detecting computer
abuse by monitoring the system’s audit records. In this approach, proﬁles
of subjects (users) are learnt and statistical methods (means and standard
deviation) used to calculate deviations from the normal behavior. Lane et al
[11] proposes another approach that captures users’ behavior. A database of
sequences of UNIX commands that a user issues normally, is maintained for
each user. Any new command sequence is compared with this database using
a similarity metric. Another approach, initiated by Forrest et al [6,9], captures
the normal behavior of processes as programs show a stable behavior over the
period of time under normal execution. In this approach, short sequences
of system calls are used to proﬁle a process. Experiments, performed over
diﬀerent data sets, show the eﬀectiveness of the approach [18]. A similar
approach is followed by Lee et al [12], but they make use of a rule learner
RIPPER, to form the rules for classiﬁcation. Sato et al [17] propose a scheme
based on the proﬁling of processes which is constructed from the ranking of
the system calls. They use a pattern matching method, called DP Matching,
to measure the distance between proﬁled and new processes. Artiﬁcial Neural
Networks have also been used for anomaly detection [7] due to their ability
to learn behavior and generalize from this learning. In their approach, Ghosh
et al use Leaky Bucket Algorithm to capture the temporal locality. A new
scheme based on the kNN Classiﬁer is proposed by Liao and Vemuri [13]
in which, each process is treated as a document and each system call as a
word in that document. The process is converted into a vector and cosine
similarity measurement is used to calculate the similarity among processes. In
a very recent proposal [16], Liao’s method is further improved by introducing
a diﬀerent metric and considering the ordering of system calls in the process.
The proposed scheme in this paper also follows a similar approach by using
kNN classiﬁer for the classiﬁcation of process.
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3 Background
In this section, we provide necessary background to understand the technique,
used in our scheme. The section also outlines the scheme of Liao and Vemuri
for the completeness of the paper as the proposed scheme implements SVD
technique on Liao’s scheme. However, the proposed technique can be used
with any method which makes use of feature vectors (i.e. data should be used
as vectors).
According to Denning, normal behavior of entities is substantially diﬀer-
ent from the intrusive behavior (abnormal behavior). Therefore, in case of
process monitoring approach, under the normal execution a process exhibits
a pattern, which is diﬀerent from the pattern under an eﬀort to exploit the
process to launch an attack. A process can be presented in terms of the system
calls made by it. It should be noted that in order to exhibit a speciﬁc pattern
under normal condition, there should be some high correlation among the sys-
tem calls made by the process. In other words, occurrence of some system
calls leads to the presence of other related system calls. If this co-occurrence
of system calls can be captured, the detection of the abnormal execution of
the process becomes easier task. In this context, we try to investigate the
idea of applying Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI) method to build an anomaly
based IDS. LSI is a relevant documents retrieval method [4], being used by
search engines [3]. In addition to learn which keywords a document contains,
the method examines the document collection as a whole, to see which other
documents contain some of those same words. LSI considers documents that
have many words in common to be semantically close and ones with few words
in common to be semantically distant. LSI looks at patterns of words distri-
bution (speciﬁcally, word co-occurrence) across a set of documents. In the
process of applying LSI, a word-by-document matrix A = [aij] is constructed
where aij is the frequency of i
th word in the jth document, i = 1, ..., m and
j = 1, ..., n. Thus each document is represented as a vector in m-dimensional
term-space [4]. In this space, documents that have many words in common
will have vectors that are near to each other, while documents with few shared
words will have vectors that are far apart. LSI works by projecting this large,
multidimensional space down into a smaller number of dimensions by decom-
posing the matrix A using a linear algebraic method called Singular Value
Decomposition (SVD), which is described in detailed in the next section. In
doing so, words that are semantically similar will get squeezed together and
will no longer be completely distinct.
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3.1 Singular Value Decomposition
SVD is closely related to a number of mathematical and statistical techniques
in a wide variety of other ﬁelds, including eigenvalue decomposition, spectral
analysis, and fractal analysis [8]. Let A be the term-by-document matrix as
described above. Then SVD of A is given by
A = T0S0D
′
0
(1)
where T0 and D0 are the matrices of left and right singular vectors and S0 is
the diagonal matrix of singular values (square roots of eigen values of ATA or
AAT ) in decreasing order, of A. T0 and D0 have orthonormal columns. These
eigen values describe the variance of each of the components. Initially S0 is
a n × n matrix with singular values ﬁlling the ﬁrst r places on the diagonal,
r = rank(A). The columns of T0 can be thought of as “term” vectors, in the
sense that each columns of T0 represent a linear combination, or pattern, of
terms that tend to occur in the same proportion. Orthogonality implies that
the columns of T0 span a vector space of dimension r, and can therefore be
regarded as axes in that space. It can be shown that the entries in the ﬁrst
column of T0 are positive which indicates the terms that tend to occur in all
documents. Entries in other columns may be positive or negative. A negative
negative entry for one term implies that when some other terms are present
in a document, the term with negative entry is less likely to be present. The
singular values in S0 (along with the entries in the matrix D0) indicate how
important the diﬀerent “term” are in each document, and those same singular
values (and the entries in the matrix T0) indicate how much each document
contributes to the corpus. It can be shown [15] that the entries in row i of the
matrix S0D
′
0
are document i’s coordinates in the new space denoted by D
′
0
.
The basis for this space is the set of term vectors, in the sense that each column
of T0 is an axis in the new space. So each document has coordinates along the
axes deﬁned by each of the columns of T0. If two documents (i.e. two rows
of S0D
′
0
) have a high value for a given coordinate i, it could be inferred that
those documents are strong in the characteristic, represented by the column
i. SVD allows a simple strategy for optimal approximate ﬁt using smaller
matrices. In the matrix S0, the ﬁrst l largest values are kept and accordingly
the size of matrices T0 and D0 are adjusted as follow:
Al = TlSlD
′
l(2)
where Tl is m × l matrix, Sl is l × l matrix and D′l is l × n matrix. The
new matrix Al is approximately equal to A and is of rank l. The amount
of dimension reduction i.e. the choice of l is critical to our work and should
be chosen carefully. The matrix Sl provides scaling, in the sense that for
any row i of the “scaled” matrix SlD
′
l (= B, say), each entry Bi,j in row
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i of B is the coordinate of document j along the axis determined by the
ith column of Tl [15]. Any similarity measure (e.g. cosine similarity) or dot
product between two column vectors of the product SlD
′
l reveals the extent
to which two documents have a similar proﬁle of terms. Any query q is also
treated as a pseudo-document, where q is a row vector of size l×m. This new
vector is mapped into the new space as follows:
qˆ = qTlS
−1
l(3)
This transformed query can be treated as one of the columns of matrix Al,
and thus can be compared against rest of the columns to ﬁnd most similar
documents, as mentioned above.
Since we apply our methodology on a recent scheme by Liao and Vemuri
and compare experimental results of our approach with that of Liao, in the
next subsection we describe Liao’s scheme in short to make the paper self-
contained.
3.2 A Host-Based Anomaly Detection Scheme by Liao and Vemuri
There are many approaches proposed in the literature to build a HIDS. A
commonly used methodology is to monitor processes in terms of system calls
invoked by them. Various processes under Unix system are converted into
vectors using the frequencies or occurrence of various system calls invoked by
those processes under normal condition. After that, a number of classiﬁers
can be applied to classify the future instances of processes as either normal or
abnormal.
An approach based on kNN classiﬁer is proposed by Liao and Vemuri [13],
where the frequencies of system calls, invoked by a program (process), are
used to deﬁne the program’s behavior. The paper presents an analogy between
Text Categorization and Intrusion Detection, in the sense that each system
call is treated as a word and a set of system calls generated by the process
as a document. The processes under normal execution are collected from the
DARPA’98 BSM data and thereafter converted into the vectors, consisting of
the frequencies of the system calls made by them during the normal execution.
From all the normal processes, a matrix A = [aij ] is formed, where aij denotes
the frequency of ith system calls in the jth process. In order to categorize a
new process P into either normal or abnormal class, the process P is ﬁrst
converted into a vector. The kNN classiﬁer then compares it with all the
processes Aj in A to determine the k nearest neighbors, by calculating the
similarity Sim(P,Aj), using the cosine formula given by equation 4.
Sim(P,Aj) =
P.Aj
‖P‖‖Aj‖(4)
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where ‖X‖ = √X.X
The average similarity value of the k nearest neighbors is calculated and a
threshold is set. When the average similarity value is above the threshold,
process P is considered as normal, otherwise abnormal.
4 Proposed Scheme
In the view of the above discussion, we suggest that if we replace terms by
system calls and documents by processes, and apply the SVD on the collection
of processes, then the correlation among the system calls occurring in the
processes can be captured. This co-occurrence of system calls can, thus, be
taken as the patterns for normal behavior. Therefore, in this work, we make
use of a spectral analysis technique- SVD, in the stage of preprocessing of
the data to reduce the dimensionality of the space. This not only reduces the
computational time but also removes noise, as afore mentioned and is shown by
means of experimental results in the next section. As noted earlier, processes
can be represented as the sequences of system calls made by them. These
sequences show patterns in terms of co-occurrence of system calls under normal
execution. The incidence matrix A can be constructed and its truncated form
Al can be obtained by using SVD using equation 2. The main advantage of
using SVD is that it tries to capture system calls which occur together in most
of the processes and projects them closer into a new space of lower dimension.
In this way, processes sharing the common system calls will become more
similar than those sharing very few system calls in common. In context of
IDS, every new process is considered as a query, to be matched against the
document database (i.e. normal processes, contained in the product SlD
′
l).
Thus each new process P is ﬁrst mapped into the new space using equation
3. This new transformed process, say Pˆ , is matched against the columns of
the product SlD
′
l using the cosine similarity measure given by equation 4. At
this stage kNN-algorithm is applied to classify the process as either normal
or abnormal. In other words, cosine similarity score of Pˆ with each column
of SlD
′
l is calculated and sorted in descending order. The ﬁrst k scores are
selected and their average is calculated. If this average is greater than some
predeﬁned threshold value, then the process is declared as normal otherwise
abnormal.
5 Experimental Setup and Results
Our objective is to show the use of SVD to reduce the dimension of the space
and remove the noise without degrading the performance of the system. We
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choose two data sets to perform the experiments- DARPA’98 BSM data and
UNM data for various applications such as sendmail, inetd, login and ps. The
code for performing all the experiments is written in Matlab [14], running on
a Windows 2000 machine.
5.1 Experiments with DARPA data
DARPA’98 BSM data is widely used data set for the evaluation of host-based
IDS. Therefore we choose this data set to test our scheme. Another reason
of choosing this set is that one of the recent proposals by Liao and Vemuri
[13] uses the same data for their scheme and we are interested to show the
performance of our scheme vis-a-vis Liao’s scheme. However, we repeat the
experiment with Liao’s scheme to calculate the results in our setup.
We use BSM audit logs from the 1998 DARPA data for the training and
testing of our algorithm. After analyzing the whole training data, we extract
the 53 unique system calls that appear in the training data. Actually 3 of
these system calls are one of the original system calls but with diﬀerent suf-
ﬁx/preﬁx. On analyzing the whole BSM logs (list ﬁles), we locate the ﬁve days
which are free of any type of attacks. There is a total of 1937 normal sessions
reported in the four days data. We carefully extract the processes occurring
during these days and our training data set consists of 769 unique processes.
There are 412 normal sessions on the ﬁfth day and we extract 4443 normal
processes from these sessions for testing data. In order to test the detection
capability of our method, we incorporate 40 intrusive sessions into our testing
data. An intrusive session is said to be detected if any of the processes associ-
ated with this session is classiﬁed as abnormal. Thus detection rate is deﬁned
as the number of intrusive sessions detected, divided by the total number of
intrusive sessions.
In this case, the incidence matrix A is of the size 53 × 769. We calculate
the SVD of A. To reduce the dimension of the matrix, we choose the sin-
gular values greater than 100 (l = 15), greater than 20 (l = 22) and greater
than 10 (l = 27) for experimentation. For kNN classiﬁer, we choose three
values K = 5, 10, 15. To measure the eﬀectiveness of the approach, we per-
form experiments with diﬀerent combinations of these values. On the basis of
experiments, the combination which gives the best result is K = 5, 10, 15 and
l = 27. The results are shown in table 1.
This combination achieves a 100% detection rate at 23% false positive rate,
which is quite a comparable result with other schemes.
As mentioned earlier, we calculate results using Liao’s scheme for compar-
ison to show the usefulness of our approach. Following table 2 summarizes the
ﬁndings with Liao’s scheme. In this case, we attain a detection rate of 100%
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l=27
K = 5 K = 10 K = 15
Threshold FP DR Threshold FP DR Threshold FP DR
0.20 0.06 0.73 0.20 0.06 0.80 0.20 0.06 0.80
0.24 0.08 0.83 0.24 0.09 0.85 0.24 0.11 0.85
0.27 0.09 0.85 0.27 0.12 0.85 0.27 0.12 0.85
0.30 0.12 0.93 0.30 0.15 0.93 0.30 0.17 0.95
0.33 0.15 0.95 0.33 0.18 0.98 0.33 0.18 0.98
0.37 0.23 1.0 0.37 0.23 1.0 0.37 0.23 1.0
0.40 0.25 1.0 0.40 0.25 1.0 0.40 0.25 1.0
Table 1
False Positive Rate vs Detection Rate for diﬀerent values of K = 5, 10, 15 at l = 27
Threshold FP DR
0.930 0.008 0.70
0.950 0.035 0.73
0.970 0.054 0.83
0.980 0.058 0.92
0.985 0.129 0.95
0.990 0.181 0.95
0.992 0.211 1.00
Table 2
False Positive Rate vs Detection Rate for Liao’s Scheme
at 21% false positive with vector size 1×53, whereas it is 100% detection rate
at 23% false positive rate with vector size 1× 27 under our scheme. Thus, we
achieve almost same performance with vector size as low as half of the vector
size in Liao’s scheme (see the ROC curve in ﬁgure 1). The total computing
time in Liao’s scheme is about 1900 seconds, whereas it is 1500 seconds in
our method. We consider this as a good improvement as far as the computing
time and timely response is concerned.
Our next round of experiment involves the data sets obtained from UNM
site (http://www.cs.unm.edu/˜immsec/systemcalls.htm) which is described in
the next section.
5.2 Experiments with UNM Data
Our objective of experimenting with UNM data sets is to test another aspect
of LSI, and thus SVD, in the realm of ID systems. As discussed earlier, LSI
understands the semantic meaning of the documents and words in the terms of
the co-occurrence of words in the documents. This co-occurrence is very high
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Fig. 1. ROC curve for Liao’s Scheme and the proposed scheme
if the documents belong to one category (topic). In case of DARPA BSM
data, though the processes, collected for training, are normal, they belong
to diﬀerent applications. One implication of this is that it is very diﬃcult
to capture extracted common meaning components of many diﬀerent system
calls (words) and processes (documents) [4]. This may be a reason that in
DARPA data, we get a bit high false positive rate. Data sets at UNM site are
available for diﬀerent applications i.e. each data set belongs to one category
(topic). We choose sendmail, inetd, login and ps data sets for our experiment.
In the following paragraphs, we detail our experimental results for each of
them.
5.2.1 Sendmail Data Set
The sendmail program was traced on an MIT AI lab running SunOS 4.1.1.
In normal data set, which is collected for approximately three days, there
are originally 71767 traces. We discard some very large processes and the
ﬁnal set consists of 65026 processes. Out of these, we keep 3000 processes
for testing data set. These remaining 62024 processes are again processed
to extract 10764 unique processes. We separate 6000 processes for training
and remaining 4764 processes are mixed with already chosen 3000 processes.
Thus our normal testing data set consists of 7764 processes out of which at
least 4764 are not used in training set. As there is no attack data set with
this trace of sendmail, we choose attack data from UNM synthetic sendmail
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data (http://www.cs.unm.edu/˜immsec/data/synth-sm.html) for the following
attacks: Sunsendmailcp intrusion, Decode intrusion, and Error condition -
forwarding loops. There are a total of eight attacks involved in the testing
data set. The incidence matrix A is constructed from the normal processes
and decomposed using SVD. For our experiment, we consider singular values
greater than 20 (l = 28) and ﬁrst 10 most similar processes for kNN. We get a
detection rate of 100% with false positive as low as 0.06%. However, when we
analyze the intrusive processes, we ﬁnd that most of them is containing system
calls that are not in the set of normal system calls. That may be due the fact
that we choose diﬀerent data set for intrusive data, in which the mapping
may be diﬀerent. Despite these, we are able to diﬀerentiate among normal
and abnormal processes with vector size of only 1× 28, whereas original size
is 1× 64.
5.2.2 inetd, login and ps data sets
inetd program initiates a daemon process in background and then exits. The
intrusion to exploit this program is a DoS attack that ties up network con-
nection resources. There are a total of three normal processes for training
i.e. for constructing incidence matrix A. Due to the lack of suﬃcient number
of normal processes [18], we cannot test the false positive rate for these data
sets. There is one attack against this program, which involves 29 processes.
There is a total of 35 unique system calls made by these 3 processes under
normal execution. For our experiment, we choose l = 3 and K = 3, i.e. we
take all the processes into consideration for kNN classiﬁer. At the threshold
of 0.25, we could identify the attack. What is most encouraging is that only
the vectors of size 1×3 (about 12 times shorter) are suﬃcient to take decision
about normality or abnormality.
For login data set, two attacks are recorded, which involve Trojan intru-
sion. There are a total of 12 normal processes for training. There are 47
unique system calls occurred during the normal execution of the program.
For experiment, we choose the singular values greater than 1, i.e. l = 6. We
chose K = 4 for kNN classiﬁer. At the threshold value of only 0.04, we are
able to detect both of the attacks. With this small value, it can be said that
all the normal processes should not be detected as intrusions and therefore a
very low false positive rate is expected. Once again, we are able to achieve
this performance at vector size of 1× 6 only (original size is 1× 47).
ps gives a snapshot of the current processes. Like login program, two
attacks are recorded for this data, which involve Trojan intrusion. These
intrusions allow unauthorized access to the system through a built in “back-
door”. There are a total of 24 normal processes for training and 22 unique
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system calls. For experiment, we choose the singular values greater than 1,
i.e. l = 6. We chose K = 4 for kNN classiﬁer. At the threshold value of only
0.28, we are able to detect both of the attacks. Once again, we are able to
achieve this performance with vector size of only 1×6 (original size is 1×22).
In the view of above experiments, it can be asserted that data reduction
indeed improves the performance of the ID systems by saving computational
time and reducing the noise present in the data.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Instead of presenting a new method of classifying data as normal or abnormal,
the present study focuses on the preprocessing of the data. As has been
observed by the study of Julisch [10], data mining in intrusion detection is
mainly used to construct a ”black box” that detects intrusions. Through this
study, we explore a less-paid-attention, yet important area in the process
of intrusion detection. Our study shows that by applying LSI technique,
dimensionality of the data can be reduced without loosing its performance.
It is also established by experimental results that this method of reduction
performs better in case of ’per-application’ data set e.g. login, inetd etc. As
a future task, we are further analyzing the decomposition of incidence matrix
to gain some insight about the association among system calls under normal
and abnormal execution to better understand the process proﬁling. Such
knowledge could be used to capture normal proﬁles of the programs for better
intrusion detection systems.
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